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ABSTRACT
Employment matches under uncertainty are typically accompanied by
opportunities for information acquisition. Workers can acquire specific
information about productivity lotteries at the firmorgeneral informa-
tion affecting their probabilistic beliefs about work elsewhere, Enter—
arises can acquire specific information concerning the productivity of a
particular worker or general information about different groups of work-
ers in a production process. In all cases, the market equilibrium with
flexible wages is efficient. Moreover, there is no opportunity for
strategic behavior that would alter this result. Both formsofinforma-
tion are associated with rising earnings profiles over time, hut the
steepness is greater in the general case. The negative turnover—wage
relation is attributable in part to the lower match termination rate
of workers with productive lob histories, who earn higher wages than
their less productive counterparts. General information is associated
with more termination of employment matches by employers and employees
than is specific information. The implications of specific/general
information for matching processes in many respects aralle1 the role
of that distinction in human capital theory, strengthening the link






The major post—school investment in individuals' productivity is
through worker training. Specific training affects the worker's firm—specific
skills, while general training also alters his productivity elsewhere.
As the human capital literature of the past two decades has shown,
many important employment patterns are consistent with the theory's
predictions
Both forms of training are associated with higher post—training
wages, but the extent of the wage increase is greater for general
training since these workers are paid their post—training marginal
product. The age—earnings profile for generally trained workers is
also steepened by the foregone earnings during the initial training
period. Training also influences worker turnover, as a larger specific
training component will diminish such job changing.
Although this theory has been largely developed in terms of
explicit training programs involving direct training costs, the pos-
sibility of learning—by—doing as part of a general productionprocess is
not ruled out.2 What Is essential is that worker productivity actually
increase as a result of some activity at the firm.
he rather voluminous literaturedealing with these patterns
includes: Becker (1964), Ben—Porath (1970) Lazear (1976), Mincer (1974),
Mincer and Jovanovic (1979), 01 (1962), Parsons (1972), Pencavel (1972),
Reder (1962), and Rosen (1972a,b).
2Thenotionof learning—by—doing, which was first analyzed by Arrow
(1962), is considered for the training case by Rosen (1972a,b).—2—
A considerable, more recent literature has addressed theproperties
of marriage and other economic matches in general3,employment matches
with worlar search4, and employment matches with jointlearning by firms
and workers.5 The focus here will be on those economicmatches formed
with imperfect information, about the attractiveness of thematch, but
in which there is the opportunity for resolving thisuncertainty through
one's experiences. Matches that turn out to be successful havea higher
total value, where the rent associated with therelationship may be
referred to as the specific capital of the match.
Despite the similarity in terminology., quite different economic
processes may be at work in the specific training and general matching
problems. Specific human capital Investment involves a change in
worker productivity that typically takes place in a known environment.
In the stochastic matching problem, one can view the worker'spro-
ductivity at the firm as a lottery on n states of the world, each of
which has an associated productivity.6 The matchingprocess consists
of forming judgments about the true state of the world andcontinuing
only employment relationships that are believed to be productive. The
worker's state—specific productivity remains unaltered.
3See, particularly, Becker (1974) andBecker, Landes, and Michael
(1977).
4Analyses by Mortensen (1978,1979),.Jovanovic (1979a), and Viscusi
(1979c) are primarily of this type.
5Studies in this vein includethose by Jovanovic (1979b) and
Viscusi (1979a,b and forthcoming a,b).
6Although I focus on thepure matching model, the mixed case in
which better matched workers receive more training is also quiteimportant.—3-.
The focus of thispaper will be on pure matching modelsunder
uncertainty. Within the context of thisframework, I will introduce
the Possibility of specificinformation and general informationthat
may alter the probabilistic beliefs offirms and workers. Despite
the differences in thesubstantive aspects of humancapital investments
and pure learningprocesses, there are striking parallels inthe theories.
Specific and general information
acquisition. implications for worker
wages and turnover that are in
many respects quite similar to the role
of specific and generaltraining. These findingssuggest that the most
fundamental,. generalizablaspect of the human capital training
theory
involves the specific/general
distinction rather than the actualnature
of the Productivity_enhancing
process.
The analysis presented herewill consider specific information
acquisition by firms and workers in
Section II, general learningby
workers with specific information
acquisition firms in Section III, and
general learning by firms withspecific and general worker Information
In Section IV.Therole of general information
acquisition by firms is
perhaps most novel, since it has
no counterpart In traditional human
capital theory. and has not beenconsidered by analysts ofemployment
matches under uncertainty.7 Foreach of these types ofemployment
relationships, I will assess theefficiency of competitiveoutcomes,
the wage structures that willresult, and the turnover properties
associated with the match. SectionV outlines the broaderramifications
of the theory.
7A lesscomplete analysis of generallearning by workers appears in Chapter 4 of Viscusj (l979a).—4—
II. SPECIFIC INFORMATION ACQUISITION
A. Wage Determination
Consider the following two—period situation.8 In eachperiod,
there is a lottery on whether the worker will be productive, without-
put of y, or unproductive, with output y —x.The employer's prior
probability that the worker will be productive in the first period is
q. Firms and workers do not begin with perfect information but instead
learn about the properties of the match based on the initialperiod out-
comes. I will assume that the productivity lotteries can be viewed as
independent Bernoulli trials where these probabilities are updated in
Bayesian fashion. The firm's posterior probabilities of successful
*
outcomes(output y) are q following a success in period 1, andq
following an unsuccessful outcome, where
* —9 q >q>q
8lssues explicitly relatedto models with more than two periods,
such as the tenure—turnover relation, are excluded. I consider those
issues using models akin to those presented here in Viscusi, (1979a,b,c).
Also see Jovanovic (l979b) and Mincer and Jovanovic (1979) foranalysis
along these lines.
9Thus, prior probability distributions withone—point measure are
ruled out as uninteresting. Workers may acquire either partial orperfect
information in period 1. The updating process is considered with
illustrative examples in Sections lID and IVA. Botb firms and workers
are engaged in a two—armed bandit problem. See Ber.y (1972) for an
extensive treatment of the underlying mathematics.—5—
The judgments of a representative worker are definedanalogously and
* indicatedby p, p ,andp ,where
*
p>p>p
Although p and q values will often be assumed to be equal so as to
abstract from complications arising from workermisperceptions, many
of the findings are unaffected by differences inprobabilistic beliefs
so no restrictions will be imposed at the outset.
Workers also have an interest in the job lottery outcome since
they suffer a wage loss (or foregone bonus) of c, where
O<c<x.
Nonzero values of c are utilized to promote some workersorting, but c
cannot exceed x or the company could potentially profit fromunproductive
job outcomes, creating an adverse incentives problem. Alternatively, the
analysis below could be developed assuming fixed output (x =0)but dif-
ferences in productive effort (c >0)when the unproductive state
occurs. Such an analysis could also include nonpecuniary rewards in
general. The broad implications of the theory would be unaffected by
this modification.
The representative worker has a reservationwage rate w0. The
interest rate r leads to a discount factor b for firms and workersgiven
by l/(l+r). Let w1 be the wage required if the firm does not terminate
the employment relationship after a successful period 1 outcome. Then
must satisfy—6—
w0(l+b) =w1—(l—p)c+ bp Max[w1_(l_p*)c,w0]
+ b(l—p) Max[w1—(l—p)c,w0j
For this class of job choice problems, it can be shown (see Viscusi
(].979a)) that the lowest reservation wage is associated with the
employment strategy of staying with the job after a successful out-
come and leaving after an unsuccessful outcome since the job is less
attractive in the latter instance. An offer by the firm to let the
worker remain after an unfavorable period 1 outcome consequently does
not affect w1.
The discounted reservation wage is now equal to
w0 + bw0 =w1-(l—p)c+ bp[w1_(l_p*)c] ÷ b(l—p)w0,
(1) w =w+ [(lP)+bp(l_p*)j 1 0
Let w2 indicate the wage the company must pay if it fires the worker
after a successful period 1 outcome.1° Then the employment choice is
analogous to a single period decision where
(2) w2 =w0+ c(l—p)
The expected wage net of incentive pay isw0. Sincep >p,the firm
benefits by offering workers the opportunity to continue successful
matches since
(3) w1<w2,
as one can verify. For the remainder of Section II, equation 3
10The enterprise's policy after an unfavorable outcome is irrelevant
in analyzing the reservation wage since the worker will never wish to
remain on the job in this instance.—7—
summarizes most of what we need to know about the wage structure.
B. Worker Preferences
Once a match is formed, each party has four possible choices at the
start of period 2:
1. Continue the match regardless,
2. Terminate the match regardless,
3. Continue the match only if the period 1 outcome is
successful, and
4. Continue the match only if the period 1 outcome is unsuccessful.
The worker views the wage rate as independent of his own actions. For
enterprise employment policies 1 and 3 above, the wage is w1 from
equation 1, while employment policies 2 and 4 are associated with w2
from equation 2. Using these wage rates and the other characteristics
of the employment problem, the worker calculates the value u.of
different choices by himself and the firm, where i indexes the worker's
decision, j indexes the firm's decision, and i and j range from 1 to 4, as above.
For enterprise employment possibilities 1 and 3, there are four
possible outcomes. First, the worker could remain at the firm for both
periods, yielding
u11 =(l+b)[w1—(l—p)cj.11
111t is well known that the mean value of the prior is all that
is of consequence if there is no change in the lottery in which the
individual is engaged. Only if there Is some job changing are
and p consequential.—8—
Second, the worker could leave the job after period1, regardless of
the job outcome. This behavior characterizes
u21, U23, and U43, which
consequently have identical values, where
u21 =w1
—(1—p)c+ bw0
Third, the worker could remain on the job only followinga productive
period 1 outcome as withu31, u33, and u13. Each of these values equal
u31 w1 —(l—p)c+ bp[w1 —(l_p*)c]+ b(l-p)w0
Finally, the worker could remainonthe job only after an unfavorable






Upon substituting for the value ofw from equation 1, one can determine
that
U31 > U21 > U11 > U41
The relative rank of these outcomes will be indicatedby 1,2,3, and 4,
where lower—numbered values are preferred. Theoptimal behavior involves
continuation after the job only after a successful period 1outcome.
Let u'. Indicate the value associated withu.. except that w is
1
replaced by w2. Then the utility values associated with employment

















Since > u1, the relative ranking of the values given in equation 4
will be indicated by 2', while those in equation 5 will be 4'. The
utility values ranked 2' and 4' are preferred to those ranked 2 and 4,
respectively, since in each case the primed terms are associated with
the same employment path and a higher wage rate. There will be no need
in the subsequent analysis, however, to compare the primed and unprimed
rankings.
C. Profit Values
The discounted expected profits ii.. associated with action i by
the worker and policy j for the firm can be determined similarly. For
simplicity, ij will be calculated per discounted expected employee at
the firm, facilitating comparison of the profit values.12 Enterprise
policies 1 and 3 can have three possible values. If the employment
match always continues in period 2 or always terminates after the initial




where 2l p23' and 43 are identical. Matches that continue
following a successful period 1 outcome (ir31,ir33, and ir13) have a value
= — —(1—q)(x—c)+ bq(1_q*)(xc)
31 1 l+bq
Ca1culation of two—period profit levels is somewhat sensitive
to the assumption made about the wage paid to new workers in period 2
(w1 or w2), but the equilibrium outcome is not. The procedure followed
here seemed best suited to putting the alternative 71.values on a
comparable basis.—10—
Continuation of only matches with an unfavorable outcome have a value
4l given by
= — —(x—c)(1—g)[l+b(l—qy 4l Y w1 l+b(l—q)
The relative ranking of the profit levels depends only on the
expected output levels since the wage costs are identical, so that one
obtains
3l > ll > 4l
which will be indicated by the rank 1,2, and 3, respectively. The
highest profit level is associated with retention of workers with
successful period 1 outcomes.
Employment policies 2 and 4 impose wage costs w2 but otherwise
are analogous to earlier profit values since they share the same turn-
over properties. Following the same notational convention as with
utility functions, one has that
ir ir=w =ir=ir=ir
11 12 22 32 42 24 34
and
=l4 7144
Since 'n1 > the relative value of the711j terms in equation6 will
be indicated by 2', while those in equation 7 will be designated 4', since
> ira. Since the w. values are associated with the same output and
a higher wage rate than their 71.. counterparts, the values ranked 2'
and 4' rank below 2 and 4, respectively. No further. description of the
rankings is required for the analysis below.FIGURE I
SPECIFIC INFORMATION AND PAYOFFS





3. Continue if Success
4. Continue if Failure—11—
D. Market Outcomes
Both the firm and the worker have 4possible turnover strategies
to choose from, generating 16 possiblemarket outcomes. The payoffs
to the parties are summarized in thegame matrix in Figure I, where
payoffs to the worker are in theupper left corners and those to the
firm are in the lower right corners.
Consider first the choice by the worker. Therelative ranking of
theUjj versus Uj terms is not consequential since it affects comparisons
across different columns, not the choice of therow by the worker. Row 3
is the dominant strategy for the worker sinceit offers the highest pay-
off for each possible strategy by the firm.Similarly, column 3 is the
dominant strategy for the firm, producinga stable, cooperative equilibrium
at (3,3), where each party continues the matchonly if the worker is pro-
ductive in period 1.
This outcome is considerably stronger thana Nash equilibrium. Each
party receives its highest valued reward. There isno incentive to behave
otherwise, nor would either party alter its behavior inresponse to such
strategic efforts. The sequence of moves is irrelevant,as is the pos-
sibility to pre—commit oneself to a strategyas, for example, the enter-
prise might do by adopting a predeterminedemployment policy.
The turnover characteristics of the equilibriumassociated with
specific information are that successfully matched workerscontinue the
relationship while those with a low productivitylottery outcome terminate
the relationship. Specific informationpromotes the stability of success-
ful. matches. Section III will address the issueof whether specific or—12—
general information is more conducive to worker turnover.
In assessing the economic efficiency of the outcome, the level of
the wage payments is irrelevant since they involve transfers between
the parties that net out in the social welfare calculation. The equilibrium
behavior will lead to maximization of discounted expected output so that
the specific information competitive equilibrium will be efficient.'3
The magnitude of the gain associated with the policy of terminating
unsuccessfully matched workers increases with the extent of the updating
** ofthe probability (q or p )aftera favorable outcome. Loose prior
probability assessments are preferred, for any mean value of the prior,
since they are updated more.
Consider, for example, the beta distribution (y,q) of priors para—
meterized so that q is the mean value of the prior and y is a measure of
14
its tightness. Then after m successess and n failures in a sequence
of independent Bernoulli trials, the posterior probability of a success




13Efficiency is judged based on the expectations using the employer's
probabilistic beliefs. Clearly, if these perceptions are systematically
wrong, the outcome maynotbe efficient. Expected output levels with
imperfect information never exceed those with perfect information when
evaluated using the true probabilities.
Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961) emphasize, the beta distribution
is ideally suited to analysis of Bernoulli—type trials and has properties
superior to the normal distribution in such instances.—13—
Low y's are preferred since the employment relationship is terminated
after an unfavorable outcome, making the greater downward revision for
loose priors irrelevant and the greater upward revision after favorable
outcomes the prime matter of interest. The employment relationship is
continued on an asymmetric basis ——theworker remains after a success
but leaves after a failure ——sothat only the upper right tail, is of
consequence after period 1. This preference for uncertainty does not
15 hinge on the risk neutrality of workers.
Consirthe expected wage levels of workers during their tenure at
the firm. In period 1, the expected wage is
—(l—p)c=
w0+ c [bPP—P)J
while in period 2 the expected wage assuming the worker remains at the
firmis
'i w1 'p. 0 1+bp
The workerb wage rises over time as he receives an expected wage below
in period land abovew0 in period 2. The period 2 wage gain following
a success is greater than the period 1 loss both because of the role of
discounting and the belief that there will only be a probability p that
the wage gain will occur.
The company has no incentive to renege on the offered wage contract.
If this possibility were perceived, company profits would be32' which
15The case of risk—averse workers isconsidered in Viscusi (1979a,
forthcoming—a).—14—
is below1133• If the termination policy were not perceived by workers,
the firm's profits would be the same asrr21, which is also below ri33.
In short, the turnover properties and incentives to alter behaviorover
time have been included as endogenous elements of the model and involve
no additional behavioral stipulations.
These findings also suggest that the observed negativewage—turnover relation
may not be simply due to the compensating differential situation in which
members of a homogeneous group of workersquit if thewage is insufficient.
The negative relation between the observed period 1wage and turnover
reflects the fact that poorly matched workers earn lowerwages and are
more likely to quit than are successfully matched workers. Thisproperty
holds for all models considered in subsequent sections as well. Thenegative
turnover—wage relation is an endogenously determined aspect of matching
processes with imperfect information.
Although the particular wage level does not affect the specific
information equilibrium16, the competitive firm will set thewage level
for the marginal worker using equation 1, appropriating all of thesurplus
associated with training.17 The worker has no incentive to takeretaliatory
action such as quitting, nor will he have any effective means of doingso.
Market competition is assumed to drive any profits reaped by thecompany
to zero, although this property Is not required for any of the results here.
assumes of course that some worker does not earn such a great
rent from the job that he remains after an unfavorable period 1 experience.
statement pertains to the marginal worker. Infra—marginal
workers may, of course, reap a surplus.—15—
III. GENERALWORKER INFORMATION AND SPECIFICINFORMATION
- FORENTEPSES
A. Outcomes with No Wage Policy Changes
Suppose that the worker's experiences at the firm alter his prob-
abilistic beliefs regarding his expected performance at some other job.
In much the same fashion as general training alters the worker's productivity
elsewhere, general information affects the worker's expected productivity
at another firm as well as his firm—specific productivity.18 This generality
is of no direct consequence to the firm, which continues to engage in specific
information acquisition.
Following an unfavorable job outcome, the worker can still pursue his
null alternative w0. Following a successful job outcome he can switch to
a related job at another enterprise for which his probabilistic perceptions
have been altered by the period 1 success. This job offers an expected
wage w >w0.19
Since the possibility of remaining on the uncertain job
after an unfavorable outcome remains a dominated alternative, general
Information introduces a fifth worker strategy ——choosingthe null alterna-
tive (w0) after an unfavorable outcome and switching to the independent
uncertain job offering w after a success.
18 . . . Inthe general information case, if experiences on one job affect
the probabilistic beliefs on the other position, then interdependence
is mutual. Selecting one position as the initial job is completely
arbitrary.
19For simplicity, I have replaced complete specification of the
component terms of that lottery by its expectation w.FIGURE II
GENERAL WORKER INFORMATION
AND PAYOFFS TO THE WORKER AND FIRM
WorkerStrategies
1. Continue Regardless ___________
2.Terminate Regardless ___________
3.Continue if Success ___________
4.Continue if Failure ___________

































The associated discounted expected utility valuesare
u53 w1 —(l—p)c÷bpw+ b(1—p)w0
and
U.,=U=U 51 5254•
If u33 >U51, theproblem reduces to that of Section II. This would
occur If the firm—specific learning is more valuable to the worker, or
—(i—p)c >:
Ifthe Inequality Is reversed, the two highest ranked outcomesby the
worker are u1, indicated by rank 0', andu51, Indicated by rank 0,
where 0 >1.The latter case will be consIderedhere.
General information acquisition by the worker that leads to certain




iT=11 =11 52 5411.
Figure II presents the expanded payoff matrix for this game. The
worker will adopt his dominant strategy 5, which is the only turnover
path that offers the possibility ofeither of his two most highly valued
rewards. Strategy 3 remains dominant for the firm. As before, the order
of moves and strategic behavior is irrelevant, as the stable equilibrium
is necessarily (5,3).—17—
An important issue Is whether this equilibrium is efficient. Since
the wage payments remain simply transfers, the problem is whether the
expected product has been maximized. A competitive market will, set w
S
equal to the worker's expected general output so that the decision to
switch firms after a successful outcome will be efficient If the profit to the
firm if the worker did not quit plus the opportunity cost ofa replacement (w0)






(8) w —w >x(q—q)..
8 0
* *
If one sets p equal to q and p equal to q to abstract from problems
of differing probabilistic beliefs, the worker will choose to quit
following a period 1 success if
*
c(g —g)
(9) w —w >
i+iq S 0
Even if c is set at its maximumvalue(c=x) that fully reflects the worker's
productivity, the right—hand term in equation 9 will be smaller than in
equation 8. There will be too much turnover and a bias toward opportunities
elsewhere if the wage structure remains the same as in the specific informa-
tion case.The difficulty lies in the denominator of equation 9, or the
fact that the base wage rate is the same In each period and is not manip-
ulated to reflect the worker's changing opportunities. The next two
sections will explore alternative wage mechanisms.—18—
B. Contract Termination Fees
If workers acquire general information and their period 2 productivity
is always greater elsewhere after a success, a simple solution would be to
hire workers for a single period only and lower the initialwage rate to
keep the workers at their reservation wage level in view of their improved
opportunities. While efficient, if the worker's productivity is greater
elsewhere, this situation is not particularly interesting, since it provides
no mechanism that assures that job allocations will be efficient for dif-
ferent relative productivity levels.
The first possible mechanism that will take such ramifications into
account Is to charge all workers a contract termination fee f. Workers










I will assume equation 11 is satisfied and that equation 10 is potentially
satisfied or else the highest attainable profit will be whichis—19—
below ri33. Workers with low period 1 productivity consequently leave the
firm20
The firm sets its reservation wage w such that
(12) w0 + bw0 =w—(l—p)c+bp Max[w —f,w —(l_p*)cJ
+ b(l—p)(w0—f)
Two situations must be considered: a) the worker switches to w following
a successful period 1 outcome and b) the worker remains at the firm
following a successful outcome. The firm can select either of these
situations by manipulating f.
Using equation 12, one can solve for the respective wage rates in






b 0 i+bp l+bp
The worker is unaffected by increases in f because his wages increase
accordingly.
20
Alternatively, the firm could avoid these complications by imposing
f only if a worker terminates a match with a successful outcome. This
modification would alter the wage level but leave the equilibrium outcome
and its properties unaffected. The change would, however, raise the
practical issue of whether the worker and employer could agree on the
period 1 outcome if the worker were to be penalized on the basis of that
judgment.—20—
The profits over two periods21 for each policy are given by
=y—(l—q)x+ (l—q)c —w+ bf ÷b[y—(l—q)x—
and
=— (l—q)x+ (l—q)c —
Wb+bq[y —(l_q*)x
+ (l_q*)c -wb]+ b(l—q)[y- (l-q)x —
w0 f]
Substituting for Wa and Wb and ignoring possible differences in the
probabilistic beliefs of the worker and firm (i.e., setting p =q,p =q*),
one finds that itexceedsit a b
—
w0> x[q*—q]
and conversely. The choice of whether to retain the worker or notusing f
coincides with the efficiency criterion outlins. above in equation 8.
The particular level of f is irrelevant, provided that equation 11 is
satisfied and the f value yields the desired turnover properties for
and itb as determined using equationlO. The use of the f mechanisms
raises period 1 wages and lowers expected period 2 rewards for workers.
Although efficient, fees for contract termination are difficult to
enforce since the worker has no incentive to reimburse the firm after he
1eaves. Imperfectly portable or not fully vested pension plans can serve
21Unlike the specific informationcase, it is not appropriate to
look at profits on a discounted worker basis for employment paths. That
approach would be biased in favor of general information, whose gains
would appear to be reaped in every period through lower wages, whereas
specific information only offers deferred rewards. In reality, the time
lags for each are identical.—21—
this function to the extent that the worker loses his benefitrights
when he leaves the firm. Recent pension regulations (ERISA) limit the
use of pensions as a mobility—reducing instrument by imposing minimal
standards on pension benefit transferability.
C. The Optimal Wage Structure
A more viable alternative to contract termination fees is a temporal
variation in the wage structure. Suppose that the worker would quit in
period 2 if w1 were offered or else the problem is not particularly
interesting.22 The minimal period 2wage that will keep the worker fol-
lowing a favorable period 1 outcome isw8, where





As before, the worker finds it optimal to quit following an unfavorable
outcome, as does the company.
The worker's expected post—success wage Is thus w whether he
switches to the alternative job or is offered a sufficientwage to keep
himatthe firm since equation 13 will be satisfied. The lowest first—
period wage w that will attract the worker to the firm consequently
satisfies
+ by0 =w—(i—p)c+ bpw + b(l—p)w0
or
w w0 + bp(w0—w) + (i—p)c
22The problem then Is thesame as that in Section II.—22—
The issue for the firm is whether it should let the worker quit in
period 2 or whether it should raise the period 2wage tow following a
success.23 These two options have thesame output and wage costs in
period 1 and in period 2 following an unsuccessful outcome. The only
matter of interest is which is preferable following a success. The pro-
fits associated with continuing the match are
=y—x(l_q*)—w
wherew is the net expected wage from equation 13 (w —(l_p*)c),assum-
ing p and q coincide. The value of discontinuing the match and hiring





assuming p equals q. The firm will continue the match (it> lid) provided
that
x(q*_q) >v—
Thiscriterion coincides with the efficiency criterion in equation 8.
Employment matches are continued only if the expected productivity at the
firm is greater than the worker's productivity elsewhere.
The wage schedule that achieves this outcome always lowers the
worker's period 1 wage as the worker in effect pays for information
acquisition in much the same manner as he would for general training.
The expected period 2 wage following a success is always w whether the
23
Ineither case, workers are assumed to know this wage structure
in advance.—23—
firm adopts or d The period 2 wage after an unfavorable outcome is
w0, as before.
D. Implications of General Information
General information acquisition steepens the age—earnings profile
more than would the specific information component of the process. When-
ever the temporal wage structure is adopted, as is optimal when workers
quit successful matches when w1 is offered, there is a reduction in the
period 1 wage and an increase in the expected period 2 reward. The
resulting equilibrium is efficient if the wage structure is varied in this
manner. Contract termination fees, if feasible, also would be efficient.
As with specific iearning/ the experimentation process offers greater
expected gains the more one's prior beliefs are updated after a successful
outcome. Both types of information lead to termination of.the employment
relationship after an unfavorable outcome, producing a negative wage—
turnover relationship. A productive work experience, however, will always
lead to continued employment with specific information, but will only
result in a continued relationship in the general case If the worker Is
more productive at the firm than he is elsewhere. The turnover rate
associated with general information acquisition will exceed that for specific
information. Both the wage structure and turnover properties of general
information are similar in many respects to those for general training.
IV. GENERALINFORMATIONFOR THE FIRM
A. Specific Information for Workers
Thus far, workers have been viewed as acquiring information about—24—
their productivity at the firm and elsewhere, while firmsare only concerned
with the worker's firm—specific productivity andany change in the worker's
reservation wage that results from general information.However, the firm
may. also be engaged in a form of general information acquisition in which
itlearns not simply about the productivity of aparticular worker or class
of workers, but he also updates his judgmentsregarding the productivity
of other groups of workers in that employment situation.The enterprise
may, for example, be resolving uncertainty about a productionprocess. If
high school educated workers always. meet a productionquota, one might infer
that the expected productivity of less educated workersmight be sufficient
to warrant some lowering of the educational standard.
Suppose that there are two types of workers, types 1 and 2, each of
which have the same reservation wage ratesw0. Within each group, the
workers are identical. The firm assesses the priorprobability that a
member of group I will be productive as q... Experiences of each classof
worker influence the posterior probability assessment for eachgroup since
the probabilistic beliefs are assumed to be Interdependent. The firm
must choose which class of worker to hire in each period, where one worker
is hired in each period.23 The expected output in a periodusing typei
worker after observingc1 successful outcomes for type 1 workers, c2 unsuc-
cessful outcomes for type 1 workers,c3 successful outcomes for type 2 workers,
23As examination of theanalysis below will indicate, the implications
of the model are equally applicable to hiring N workersconsisting of a
mix of type 1 and 2 workers in each period.TABLE I
DATA FOR GENERAL LEARNING PROBLEM
State of World
01 02
State Probability .1 .9
Type 1 Worker's Probability ofSuccess .8 .1
Type 2 Worker's Probability of Success 1 0—25—
and a4 unsuccessful outcomes for type 2 workers will be indicated by
E(c1,c2,c3c4). The optimal turnover policy for the firm is assumed to
be known to workers and their probabilistic beliefs are assumed to be
accurate (i.e., p =q1,p =q)so that expected net wage payments in
each period are w0 in this situation of specific worker information.
The firm's decision problem Is to choose which type of worker to
hire in each period, or to optimize
ii= Max{[E1(O,O,O,O)+ bq1Max[E1(l,O,O,O), E2(l,O,O,O)J
+ b(l—q)Max[E1(O,l,O,O), E2(O,l,O,O)],




Since the wage costs are predetermined and reflect the worker's general
productivity, the maximization of itsimplymaximizes discounted expected
output. Profit maximization and social welfare maximization coincide.
As in the case of general information for workers, general learning by
firms may lead to termination of an employment relationship that was
successful in period 1.
This possibility and the underlying motivation for the above model
can be illustrated further with the following example. Since wage costs
are identical for all possible options, they will be ignored. Moreover,
the interest rate r will be set equal to zero, resulting in a b value of 1.
Output y for a productive match is 1 and for an unproductive match is 0
(i.e., x =1).
Table I summarizes the probabilistic structure of the problem.—26—
Suppose there are two possible states of the world, and 02• There
is a .1 probability that01 pertains and a .9 probability that 02 is
the actual state. Ine1 type 1 workers have a .8 probability of being
productive while type 2 workers always produce y equal to 1. In state
02
type 2 workers are always unproductive and type 1 workers have a .1 chance
of being productive. The issue is to select the optimalemployment sequence.
Before doing so, one needs two additional sets of Information. The
expected probabilities of each group being productive in period 1 can be
readily calculated from the data in Table I, implying thatq1 is .17 and
Is .1. The posterior probabilities of being productive hingeon the
first period outcome. Since there is only one trial, there will beno
ambiquity in letting 3P(Ojc.1) denote the conditional probability
that O is the state after observing c. value of 1 where all of the other
ck ternis (k#j) equal 0. Using Bayes' Theorem, one can calculate
as
P(c Pe )P(e )
P(0 c ) =— 3. 3. 1 = .8(.l) =47 1 1P(c101)'(e1) +P(c1102)p(02).8(.l) +.l(.9)
Insimilar fashion, one finds the P(011c2)equal..02, PC81e3)equals1, and
P(011c4)equalszero.
The value of ,r given the numerical values above andignoring V0is
ITMax(.l7+.17Max[.43, .47] + .83 Naxf.1l4,, .02],
.1+ .1 Max[.8, 1.0] +.9 Max[.l,0J} =.34
The optimal sequence of decisions is to hire atype 1 worker in period 1,
switch to a type 2 worker after a favorable period 1 outcome(c1), and
continue tohire type 1 workers if the period 1 outcome is unfavorable
Cc2).-27—
Initial experimentation with type 1 workers ispreferred because they
offer sufficiently greater expected initialproductivity. However, a
successful outcome raises the conditionalprobability of 01 sufficiently
so that type 2 workers become more attractive. Aswas indicated above,
general information by the firm may lead to termination ofemployment
matches after successful productive efforts, whereasspecific information
never has this effect.
B. General Information for Both Parties
Suppose that the firm is engaged in the acquisition of information
that affects its general probabilistic beliefsregarding both classes of
workers, while the workers are also engaged in a general information
acquisition process. Following a period 1 success,type 1 workers •can earn
an expected wage w1 elsewhere while type 2 workers canearn w2. The firm
has no incentive to keep any particular workeror to fire unproductive
workers since its learning is about classes of workertypes not specific
Individuals. Assuming the worker and employer probabilisticbeliefs
coincide, the expected net period 2 wage rate will bew0. In period 1, the
job offers workers the chance for general information anda higher period





w0)for type 1 and 2 workers, respectively.
The wage structure will attract workers, and the turnoverproperties
are irrelevant. What remains an issue is whether the competitive firm's
employment policies will be efficient. Using the same notationas in






bq1Max[E1(l,O,O,O) —w0,E2(l,O,O,O) —w0] +
1(l—q1)Max[E1(O,l,O,O) —w0, E2(O,l,O,O) —w0]
E2(O,O,O,O) —+bq2(w52w0) + bq2Max
(E1(O,O,l,O) —w0, E2(O,O,l,O) —wo] +
d(l—q2)Max[E1(O,O,O,l) —w0, E2(O,O,O,l) —w0]}
This expression can be rewritten as
ii= Max{E1(O,O,O,O)+bq1Max[E1(i,O,O,O) + w1 —w0
E2(l,O,O,O) + w1—w0] + b(l—q1)Max[E1(O,l,O,O),
E2(O,l,O,O)], E2(O,O,O,O) + bq2Max[E1(O,O,l,O) +
—
w0,E2(O,O,l,O) + w2 —w0]+
b(l—q2)Max[E1(O,O,O,l), E2(O,O,O,l)] —w0 —bw
This reformulation highlights the efficiency of the firm's objective.
The enterprise maximizes the expected initial product plus the discounted
expected period 2 output at the firm and any gain In the worker's productivity
(e.g., w1—w0), less the opportunity cost of labor. As in all of the cases
considered thus far, market outcomes will be efficient. The general information
situation has the high turnover and steep wage structure that one would expect
from a combination of the two general information models.
V. CONCLUSION
For employment matches undertaken with Initial uncertainty, one can draw
a distinction between general and specific information in much the same manner
as the traditional human capital treats specific and general training. For—29—
the worker, specific information only affects his probabilistic beliefs about
his productivity at his current place of employment, while general information
alters his probabilistic beliefs about work elsewhere. Specific information
for the firm influences only its assessment of a particular worker'spro-
ductivity, whereas with general Information the firm in effect learns about
the nature of the production process and the productivity of differenttypes
of workers.
With wage rates that can vary over time, the competitive equilibrium
contracts will result in efficient job allocations and levels of turnover.
There is no potential for strategic behavior that would alter this equilibrium
outcome. Both general and specific information steepen workers' earnings
profiles, though the extent of the increase is greater in the general case.
General information also leads to more termination of employment relationships
than does specific information. In both types of learning there will be an
observed negative relationship between turnover andwages. This relation
would hold apart from any compensating differential argument because workers
who are unproductive in the initial period earn lower wages and are more likely
to switch to an alternative job in the subsequent period.
Throughout the analysis, no explicit training costs were incurred and no
changes in productivity took place. What did occur is that information generated
by work experiences enabled employers and workers to better identify the true
state of the world and to select the optimal match for that state, where all
state—specific productivity levels were assumed fixed. The diverse parallels
of the specific/general distinction in both the human capital training theory
and the employment matching analysis suggest that it is the specific/general—30—
nature of the productivity—enhancing activity which is more important than the
features of the process itself. This analysis of general and specific information
acquisition also strengthens the conceptual linkage between traditional human
capital theory and the more recent theory of marriage and other matching problems.—31—
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